Creating Credit and Rating it: New Kids on the Block in Post Crisis Global Finance by Thompson, Grahame
„One of the most intriguing developments since 
the financial crash of 2007/8 is the way it pro-
pelled Central Banks to the forefront of financial 
innovation and policy formation. As the political 
authorities abandoned activist macro-economic 
management and set their Treasuries and Fi-
nance Ministries the sole task of cutting public 
expenditure and organizing for austerity, the Cen-
tral Banks took on any management of the econ-
omy that was permissible or that they could get 
away with. ...“
Introduction
One of the most intriguing developments since the finan-
cial crash of 2007/8 is the way it propelled Central Banks 
(CBs) to the forefront of financial innovation and policy 
formation. As the political authorities abandoned activ-
ist macro-economic management and set their Treasuries 
and Finance Ministries the sole task of cutting public 
expenditure and organizing for austerity, the CBs took on 
any management of the economy that was permissible or 
that they could get away with. And this was aided by their 
semi-autonomous status, granted to them by earlier polit-
ical administration’s determination to see CBs independ-
ent of direct political control, able to pursue monetary 
policy as they saw fit, but originally set within the bounds 
of conservative inflation targeting. This is the legacy CBs 
like the US Federal Bank (US Fed), the European Central 
Bank (ECB), and the Bank of England (BoE) inherited as 
they faced the consequences of financial meltdown and 
monetary turmoil in the wake of the crisis (I come back 
to the Bank of Japan (BoJ) in a moment). But far from 
this inheritance completely constraining CBs it actually 
presented them with an opportunity: whether by design 
or fortunate circumstances they have seized the possibil-
ity of turning themselves into the premier activists of eco-
nomic management. We now have what Bowman et.al. 
(2013) have termed a ‘central bank led capitalism’ on an 
unprecedented scale and extent. If, as a consequences of 
prolonged austerity, we add in the likelihood of very low 
growth rates for many years ahead (which seems feasible, 
see Alpert 2013) then we may be moving into a new and 
unusual era for advanced capitalism – low growth central 
bank led capitalism.
This article describes some of these events and tries 
to assess their possible consequences and implications. 
The approach adopted here builds upon a ‘political arith-
metic’ that is theoretically parsimonious but empirically 
rich (see, for example, Englen, et.al 2011; Bowman et. al. 
2013). It shows how central bank led capitalism connects 
to the rest of the financial system, and how it is being 
accompanied by interesting and potentially radically dif-
ferent ways of assessing sovereign risk. Indeed, it is the 
issue of sovereign risk that is posed afresh by the rise of 
CB activism. Sovereign risk has become a major issue as 
CBs balance sheets (BS) have exploded in the manner 
described in a moment, and new ways of calculating such 
sovereign risk have emerged in its wake. 
Central Bank BSs have proved crucial in designing 
and pursuing economic policies in the wake of financial 
crises. As we will see CBs have purchased a wide range of 
financial assets in order to further major macroeconomic 
and financial stability objectives, which has implied a 
comparable increase in domestic liabilities. This has led 
to an unprecedented global expansion of CB BSs. But 
BSs of the current size could create broad policy risks, 
beyond the increased exposure of the CB to market de-
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velopments. These risks include inflation, financial in-
stability, distortions in financial markets, and conflicts 
with government debt managers. Critics of the CB BS 
explosion suggest that as huge monetary stimuluses’ have 
accumulated it becomes increasingly difficult for the CBs 
to reverse their monetary easing policy and shrink their 
BS from their current size back down to the pre-2008 
level. But the argument here will stress that this is not 
such a problem as it is often made out to be, for reasons 
outlined in a moment.
Thus this article should act as an antidote to all those 
who say, first that not much macro-economic activism 
can be discerned since the financial crisis – ‘we are all 
doomed’ by the continued stranglehold of neo-liberal 
ideology; and secondly, that there has been no, or little, 
innovation in economic policy making since the crisis. In 
actual fact we have witnessed a very innovative period, 
one which continues it will be argued. Quite where all 
this is going, however, remains unclear. Each CB has its 
own particular problems to confront – there is no effec-
tive ‘global policy coordination’ and nor is there likely 
to be. For the moment this is wishful thinking. Whilst 
the US Fed, the ECB and the BoE still retain a residual 
primary (but fast disappearing – see below) commitment 
to low inflation targeting, for the BoJ it is precisely the 
opposite as it tries desperately to increase inflation (inter-
rupt its deflationary experiences and expectations). This 
all makes international capitalism inherently unstable, 
particularly in respect to financial and monetary matters 
(Kindleberger and Aliber 2011; Minsky 1982).
The rest of this article proceeds as follows. The next 
section outlines the evolution of CB BSs since the crisis. 
It concentrates upon the four main advance country CBs 
already mentioned with something on the Danish Cen-
tral Bank (DCB) for local interest. After that we turn 
to the innovative policies that have been responsible for 
the explosion of BSs. This is flowed by a section dealing 
with the relationship between CBs and assessments of 
sovereign risk. The responses to this from those institu-
tions dealing with the ratings business is discussed in 
the penultimate section, where the characteristics of new 
metrics and those new institutions trying to muscle into 
the ratings business are discussed. The article ends with a 
conclusion outlining why this matters and what its ulti-
mate consequences might be.
The Empirics
Broadly speaking a central bank balance sheet gives a 
snapshot summary of the financial position of the CB at 
any one time. As BS assets must equal liabilities for con-
venience in what follows we concentrate upon the asset 
side. As we will see later, however, ‘reserves of commercial 
banks’ appearing on the liability side is very important for 
an examination of the policy implications of the expan-
sion of assets on the opposite side of the BS.
The Danish Central Bank, Copenhagen
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Figure 1 demonstrates what happened to the aggre-
gate assets of the US Fed, the ECB and the BoJ between 
2002 and 2012, and for a contrast it includes the Chi-
nese central bank (PBoC). We return to the PBoC in a 
moment but first we concentrate on the three advanced 
country CBs. 
In absolute terms the ECBs assets more than trebled. 
There were two main noteworthy episodes: the first in 
the latter part of 2008 and the second in the early part of 
2012. The first was associated with the onset of the crisis 
as the ECB tried to staunch the loss of liquidity in the Eu-
rozone and support its banks whilst the second had more 
to do with the sovereign debt crisis amongst mainly the 
countries in the south. But what this diagram illustrates 
is that far from being moribund the ECB was very active. 
Despite a hugely constraining political and organizational 
environment the ECB continually pressed against these 
obstacles and extended its mandate considerably.
 If we now turn to the US Fed the big push happened 
just after the original crisis during 2008. This mainly 
involved supporting the domestic banking and wider fi-
nancial system via the policy of, first, the Troubled Asset 
Recovery Program (TARP) – an emergency measure in-
troduced to staunch the liquidity losses in the immediate 
aftermath of the crises -- and then quantitative easing 
(QE -- more on this innovative policy later). The key ele-
ment for the expansion of the asset side are the mortgage 
backed securities (MBS) which the Fed bought-in to pre-
vent the holders of these going bankrupt as their value fell 
with the collapse of the US housing market. Subsequently 
this was overtaken by QE driven bond purchases. But 
note that unlike for the ECB, there was no subsequent 
sovereign debt crisis to contend with.
Initially the Fed gave assistance mainly to US finan-
cial institutions but not exclusively so. It supported Wall 
Street and the international financial system beyond. 
Again, this marks out the particularity of the US Fed’s 
role. Keoun and Kuntz (2011) eestimate that between 
2007 and 2010 US$ 1 trillion was dispensed by the Fed1. 
Later estimates for overall ‘global’ support for distressed 
financial institutions – in the USA and beyond -- sug-
gests this amount was anywhere between US$7 trillion 
and nearly US$9 trillion. This just demonstrates the huge 
amount of public subsidy that has been pumped towards 
private financial interests: a veritable corporate welfare-
ism of unprecedented scale.
figure 1: assets of the ecb, the us fed, the boJ and the pboc: 2002-2012 (trillions of us dollars)
Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream.
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These trends are mirrored in the case of the BoJ (Iwata 
& Takenaka 2012) though the cycle of expansion is dif-
ferent. The BoJ embarked on a program of QE in 2001, 
which lasted until 2006 (this had to do with the much 
earlier onset of domestic financial disruption in Japan). 
As a consequence between 1997 and 2005 its assets in-
creased from 12.5% of GDP to over 32%. Subsequently 
other polices were introduced (corporate financial facili-
tation, comprehensive monetary easing) so that, after a 
fall in the BS between 2006 and 2007 it began to climb 
again to be 30% of GDP by 2012 (Iwata and Tanaka 
2012, Figure 1).
But look also at the position of Chinese CB. The Peo-
ple’s Bank of China (PBoC) has overtaken the Fed, BoJ 
and even the whole euro system by assets in recent years 
and has become the largest central bank in the world2. 
Thus the developments outlined in respect to the main 
advanced capitalist country CB have not been confined 
just to these. 
In addition we could add in the Bank of England, 
whose assets double between February 2009 and October 
2012 ( see http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/
Pages/balancesheet/default.aspx) and a small open econ-
omy like Denmark, the experience of which is illustrated 
by Table 1.
table 1: danish central bank balance sheet 2000-2012 
(assets at year end)















Source: Compiled from various Danish National Bank statistical 
sources.
There were significant increases in the early 2000s (associ-
ated with Denmark’s domestic bank bailouts) but the big 
jump associated with the financial crisis occurred in 2008 
when the yearly increase was almost 50%. Things slowed 
down for a few years after that but then began to increase 
again in 2011 and 2012 as ‘safe haven’ money began to 
flow into Denmark (see below). Over the entire period 
2000-2012 there was a 165% increase in assets.
Finally, we have a comparison between the four main 
Western CBs in Figure 2, expressing their assets as a per-
centage of country GDP. This illustrates the significance 
of the BoJs interventions relative to the others despite its 
smaller overall absolute size. The ECB also looks very 
exposed, the US Fed the least.
Again, this means the ECB will face a different set of 
problems in unwinding its position than the US Fed or 
the BoE (or the BoJ, see immediately below). Different 
policies will be in order to deal with different circum-
stances.
What Have Been the Innovative Policies?
The above data illustrated the consequence of CB actions 
but what exactly were those actions? This section dis-
cusses several of the more important policy developments 
since 2008. But first we describe how the main CBs are 
institutionally configured.
The BoE is formally a limited liability company fully 
owned by the UK Treasury. The US Fed is in a more com-
plicated legal position since it is a Federation of several 
(12) quasi-independent regional banks (Federal Reserve 
Districts), which have significant private institutional in-
volvement, making the FRS a mix of public and private 
interests. However, the Federal Reserve Bank has legisla-
tive backing, and is a properly constituted central bank 
and banker to the US government.
In the UK the BoE’s Monetary Policy Committee 
is the body responsible for conducting monetary policy 
– setting interest rates and determining the general condi-
tions for lending and borrowing. The parallel body in the 
US Fed is the Federal Open Market Committee. But CBs 
also act as the banker to the government. For instance 
as the government’s bank the Fed acts as its fiscal agent: 
the US Treasury keeps an account with the Federal Re-
serve, through which incoming federal tax revenues and 
outgoing government payments are made. It also sells 
and redeems US Government securities such as savings 
bonds and Treasury bills, notes and bonds, and it issues 
the nations coin and currency. In the UK it is the BoE 
that directly issues TBs on behalf of the government. It 
also manages the country’s foreign exchange and gold 
reserves. Both CBs also act as a lender of last resort. The 
ECB is a corporate entity with shareholders and capital 
stock (€5billion) which is owned by the central banks 
of all 28 EU member states. It is formally controlled by 
a Governing Council made up of representatives of the 
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Eurozone countries. In a similar way to the other CBs 
is acts as the Eurozone’s banker, issuing Euro currency, 
managing the foreign reserves of member states and the 
exchange rate of the Euro, and devising and conducting 
monetary policy. But it does not have explicit lender of 
last resort powers.
 Returning to the policies pursued an early caution 
is in order since it could be argued that there is nothing 
necessarily radically innovative about these policy devel-
opments. In a moment we discuss ‘quantitative easing’ 
(QE) – which is the main claim to innovation in this 
environment – but it could be said it is nothing more 
than a revamped form of traditional ‘open market opera-
tions’ (OMO) by the CBs. Whilst recognizing this as a 
possible argument it is suggested here that what we have 
witnessed since 2008 exceeds traditional OMO in both 
its extent and range. OMO is essentially a short term 
policy instrument designed to affect short-term interest 
rates and the amount of ‘base-money’ in the economy. 
The sheer size of the recent interventions and their lon-
gevity is unprecedented – and amounts to more than the 
orthodoxy of financial policy. In addition, as we will see 
in a moment, the level and variety of ‘subsidies for lend-
ing’ vastly exceeds normal practice. We concentrate upon 
QE here for convenience3.
QE (practiced mainly by the US Fed, the BoE and 
the BoJ, but also the Swiss National Bank) involves the 
CB ‘buying’ gilts from the private sector financial institu-
tions in the hope that this will on the one had help ‘repair 
their balance sheets’ and on the other hand stimulate the 
commercial banks to extend loans so as to encourage eco-
nomic activity generally. By selling their gilts and other 
paper the commercial banks would now have enhanced 
credit with the CB, which can act as more solid assets 
in their own BS, thus affording them the possibility of 
extending their liabilities in the form of credit creation to 
the private sector (to firms and individuals). This is the 
basic mechanism. But it can have all sorts of effects. There 
have been various rounds of QE – the first of which is 
generally recognized to have helped support share prices 
(thus shoring up the stock markets) while the second 
round is helping to restore balance sheets.
But there is a key theoretical issue at stake in this, 
which illustrates its possible undoing. It is often claimed 
that this mechanism involves the CB simply ‘printing 
money’ – principally in the form of ‘central bank base 
money’ – because how else could it ‘purchase’ the com-
mercial banks assets/gilts? However, this is not altogether 
the case or quite that simple. Under these circumstances 
the CB does indeed extend ‘credit’ to the commercial 
banking system (which would appear as an increase in 
reserve balances on the liabilities side of the CB balance 
sheet referred to earlier), but it does not print money 
directly, nor extend credit directly to the household or 
commercial sector. That is the job -- indeed, the whole the 
rationale – of the commercial banks themselves. The CBs 
policy of QE is based upon a hope and a prayer. In our fi-
nancial world it is commercial banks that directly ‘control 
the money supply’ not the CB (or, indeed -- and God for-
bid -- the government). Orthodox monetary policy dic-
figure 2: balance sheets compared: ecb, us fed, boe and boJ (2004-2013 – expressed as a % of gdp)
Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream
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tates that commercial banks should have control over the 
money supply under capitalism – i.e., private economic 
agents – not the public authorities: that would be tanta-
mount to socialism, i.e., the administrative control over 
credit creation and allocation. This capacity to control 
the money supply by private agents – via the direct exten-
sion of credit money to households and firms (creating a 
deposit for them in their accounts at their commercial 
bank) -- is jealously guarded by the financial system and 
even QE could not fully challenge this nostrum. Under a 
monetized capitalism that agent who controls the money 
supply has control over economic resources, so it is clear 
what is ultimately at stake in this process.4
Thus what QE amounts to is a very unorthodox form 
of the orthodoxy. The CB policy of QE may have helped 
to re-establish the strength and credibility of commer-
cial banks’ balance sheets, but there is no necessary link 
between this and the extension of private credit, i.e., an 
enhancement of the money supply in the form of loans 
to the private sector of households and firms. That is a 
decision left to the commercial banks themselves, and, 
indeed, much to the frustration of the governments and 
the relevant CBs, there is growing evidence that they have 
not done so. As shown in Figure 3, despite the escalation 
of the monetary base consequent upon bond purchases, 
the actual bank lending to the private sector has stag-
nated. Of course this may be because there is no demand 
for loans by the private sector. The private sector is de-
leveraging to restore credibility to its BSs and increas-
ing savings, which lie dormant in the financial system5. 
Again, this reinforces the idea that the policy is based 
upon a wish and a prayer.
The alternative would be to issue ‘helicopter money’ 
--- where the CB simply drops money directly onto the 
general public by, say, sending them an individual cheque 
– but this has been ruled out for fairly obvious reasons. 
Of course, this whole policy initiative is also predicated 
on a conception that increasing the (credit) money made 
available to the private sector will indeed stimulate con-
sumption, commercial activity or investment, or what-
ever. That is also part of the hope and the prayer. The 
BoE has purchased £375billions worth of gilts as part of 
its QE program, which amounts to a direct subsidy to 
the commercial banks. As mentioned above in the US 
QE began in 2009, and has been successively extended 
in various phases. As of December 2012 ‘QE Infinity’ 
began (sometimes known as QE 4) – infinite bond pur-
chases until the US labour market recovered --see below. 
But by June of 2013 that labour market improvement 
was evident and the ‘tapering back’ of QE was broached 
by the Fed. The possible reversal of the program threw 
into stark relief the potential difficulties of unwinding 
figure 3: monetary base and bank lending
Source: Koo 2012, Exhibit 10, p.30.
12 T IDSSKRIF TE T POLIT IK  CRE ATING CREDIT AND R ATING IT
the CBs BS position quickly and extracting the Fed from 
its entrenched support of the financial system, something 
returned to in a moment.
Thus whilst a great deal of effort and energy (po-
litical, ideological and economic) has been expended on 
QE it may have repaid sparse real economic dividends. 
But what it has done is hugely inflate the CBs BSs -- as 
shown above -- as they have ‘purchased’ more and more 
privately owned assets in an attempt to ‘kick start’ private 
sector monetary growth and with it economic activity 
more generally. Whist the jury still remains out on what 
the ultimate effect of it will be on economic growth it is 
towards a discussion of its consequences within the finan-
cial system that we turn in a moment. And what happens 
here may also ultimately affect economic growth, which 
is returned to in the conclusion.
But first what other policies have of CBs resorted to?
Ever since Ben Bernanke voiced an official concern 
in 2012 with US unemployment (that had peaked at 
10% in October 2009 – see < http://www.federalreserve.
gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20120831a.htm >), CBs 
have toyed with a range of possible new policy mandates. 
As unemployment in the US fell to around 7.5% in 2012, 
an official unemployment objective was established by the 
Fed at 6.5%. In fact the US Fed has a ‘dual mandate’: to 
both establish stable prices and maximize employment, 
though the inflation objective had up until the recent past 
been considered its prime task. 
The additional innovative part of this policy was 
to pre-commit the CB to maintain its policy stance on 
interest rates until the objectives for inflation and par-
ticularly unemployment had been met. But this explicit 
statement by Bernanke set off a debate amongst other 
CBs as to whether they should also target unemployment 
like Bernanke was encouraging6. Or should they adopt 
an explicit growth rate target (‘nominal GDP’ target-
ing). Or should they engineer negative nominal interest 
rates? The BoE floated this idea in February 2013. And 
the Danish Central Bank (DCB) adopted this policy ex-
plicitly. Investors would now pay the Danish authorities 
to lodge their money on overnight deposits in Denmark. 
In Denmark’s case this policy – and its general policy of 
keeping all interest rates at zero or as near as possible to 
this – is designed to maintain the exchange rate between 
the Krone and the Euro7. Thus here the DCB’s policy 
is principally directed at exchange rate stability, another 
possible policy target for CBs more generally and another 
indicator of the different objectives facing different coun-
tries in managing their economies. The exchange rate 
between the Krone and the Euro is the foundation on 
which all of Denmark’s macro-economic policy is based. 
On the other hand the ECB – which also toyed with this 
idea on negative interest rates in May 2013 – views this as 
a policy for stimulating private demand in the traditional 
manner, not for stabilizing the Euro exchange rate.
Of course the BoJ has also adopted an implicit ex-
change rate policy, since in keeping interest rates very 
low the idea is to encourage spending and to see the Yen 
exchange rate fall, so as to make Japanese exports more 
competitive. This is viewed as the way out of its deflation-
ary malaise. Although this policy mix is often attributed 
to the Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe (‘Abeconomics’), the 
recently appointed new governor of the BoJ, Haruhiko 
Kuroda, was the key player in devising the package.
But most ‘innovative’ CB policies have been associ-
ated with direct subsidies to the banks to try to stimulate 
lending, like QE discussed above. Further example of 
this are the UK’s ‘Funding for Lending’ (F4L) program 
(another £80 billion), or its subsidy on mortgages to help 
buyers climb the housing ladder announced in the April 
2013 Budget.
Amongst all of this, however, what is left of inflation 
targeting, the original mandate for independent CBs? 
Very little, or so it seems. Inflation has slipped down the 
policy agenda as CBs have seized the opportunity to ex-
ploit their new found freedoms to experiment with policy 
making. They may not know quite what they are doing, 
or what they should do. They may all have different objec-
tives. But they have certainly been active. Some would say 
over active, and they will reap the downside consequences 
later (e.g., Stockman 2013). But what might those conse-
quences be? This we turn to in the next section.
Central Banks and Sovereign Risk
I outlined the functions of the CBs above to indicate that 
they are intimately tied to the financial functions of their 
respective Treasuries, governments and financial systems 
beyond. They are part of an elaborate and complex of 
institutions and mechanisms that are scrutinized for es-
tablishing the risks and rewards associated with sovereign 
debt, for instance. In this, of course, the overall fiscal 
position of the government is crucial but so too is the 
state of its banking sector and CB. Indeed, it is just this 
‘fiscal position’ that the explosion of CBs BSs indicates. 
At the end of the day, QE and all the rest represents a 
fiscal problem for the government and the public since 
this is a debt that has to be ‘repaid’, even though it is 
formally on the books of the CB. The expansion of the 
CBs BSs indicated above was a result of a decision about 
public expenditure, involving a huge public subsidy to 
the financial system. Several possible consequences follow 
which are only presented here in outlined (Caruana 2012; 
Weidmann 2013).
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First, will it be possible for the CBs to unwind their 
newly acquired financial positions as indicated by their 
BS? This issue was posed acutely in June 2013 as the US 
Fed hinted at a policy of imminent phased withdrawal of 
QE. Of course this threw the US financial markets into 
instant turmoil. The prospect of interest rate rises upsets 
plans and expectations throughout the financial system. 
But this policy re-adjustment would have implications 
beyond the US. The economic cycle in the US is in quite 
a different phase than in Europe. Europe was still mired 
in deep recession in mid-2013 whereas the US economy 
was on a recovery trajectory. So despite anything else, this 
makes prospects of global policy coordination even more 
unlikely since these two economic blocks were facing 
quite different current economic conditions. But these 
involve essentially short-term consideration. What about 
the longer term?
Economist would answer ‘yes’ to the longer term 
prospect of successful unwinding because of their faith 
in the market mechanism: as conditions improve and 
the expansionary BS phase comes to an end the CB can 
re-package their acquired debts and sell them as mar-
ket sentiment improves. It might even make a profit on 
these transcations. There may be something in this as 
will be indicated in a moment, but the medium term 
uncertainties are legion and the political cost may be 
prohibitive – fiscal conservatives are incensed by these 
policies (Stockman 2013). But there are three somewhat 
alternative policy options available here: explicitly wind 
down the position as just suggested; hold on to it and 
keep things as they are (why should the CB really worry 
about this since it is a sovereign risk and the CB will not 
default); relatedly, wait for it to be eroded by inflation in 
the longer-run.
What about the sovereign debt issue? This is related 
to what has just been said. Given the dangers associated 
with such a large and swift ‘deterioration’ of the CBs 
BS might this not inhibit investors when thinking about 
acquiring further sovereign debt? The state of the CBs 
BS is also an indicator of the state of the sovereigns’ BS, 
since this is ultimately a form of public debt. However, 
as indicated by the discussion of the Danish case, things 
are complicated by several other factors.
At this stage it is important to bring in the credit 
rating agencies, since there are the bodies that actually 
establish the credit rating for sovereign debt. The three 
big CRAs are Standard and Poor, Fitch and Moody’s 
(who collectively control 95% of the global credit ratings 
market). These bodies are important because they have 
semi-official status as regulatory institutions, fulfilling a 
public purpose despite them being privately owned (Sin-
clair 2008). The CRAs assess the risks associated with 
financial investment in both private corporations and 
sovereign debt. They rank various institutions and sov-
ereigns -- -- rating the debtor’s ability to pay back the 
debt, make timely interest payments and the likelihood 
of default. Traditionally, the countries we have been deal-
ing with above were ‘Triple A rated’ by these agencies: as 
a result their debt was judged as ‘risk-less’: they were the 
ultimate ‘safe havens’. Recently, however, there has been 
some down grading of their debt as their fiscal position 
deteriorated and growth prospects faltered (e.g., for the 
US and UK). But a problem here is that there is a growing 
loss of confidence in these bodies in the wake of their role 
in the run up to the financial crisis. They failed to spot the 
emerging problems and were compromised by their dual 
role as both assessors of risks and advisors/consultants 
to the very financial institutions they are assessing. This 
disillusionment with the existing CRAs has provided a 
space for some potential competitors to emerge in the 
credit ratings business. And this is a further indicator of 
potential quite rapid institutional change in this world. 
New bodies are marketing their indexes, claiming they 
are superior in their methodology in the new period of 
CB-led capitalism and are not compromised by past mis-
takes in the old era. Thus whilst we may have another 
round of potential ‘financial innovation’ emerging here, 
this time it is not one involving yet another exotic finan-
cial instrument or form of securitized debt obligation 
(for the foreseeable future that era is probably over) but, 
rather, a new and better index of sovereign risks, one suit-
able for a new era of ‘sovereign debt crises’, fiscal austerity 
and CB BS inflation.
Sovereign creditworthiness assessment has developed 
with the huge expansion of the sovereign credit default 
swap market in the aftermath of the financial crisis which, 
like credit ratings more generally, constitutes an exten-
sion of corporate methodology into the sovereign sector.
A CDS is a credit protection contract whereby credit 
risk is sold to a third party that agrees to make a payment 
in the case of a defined ‘credit event’ in exchange for a 
periodic premium. Traditionally CDSs are not traded on 
exchanges but are privately negotiated between two coun-
terparties. However new clearing solutions are increas-
ingly being offered which consolidate these instruments, 
track them and offer an instant clearing mechanism8. In 
addition, the huge increase in public borrowing indicated 
above sparked the creation of several tradable indices that 
track sovereign credit risk of comparable countries: in 
2009 the iTraxx Europe for 15 countries in the Eurozone, 
plus Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the UK; in 2010 the 
iTraxx CEEMEA for 15 countries in central and eastern 
Europe, the Middle East and Africa; and several other 
indexes for the G7, BRIC and various other combina-
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tions of emerging market sovereigns. These indices are 
owned, managed and marketed by the financial informa-
tion group Markit9.
What these particular CDS rating models do is to 
process the collective market view of issuers’ credit con-
dition from CDS prices and convert them into implied 
rating probabilities of default. Clearly, in normal times 
the more ‘liquid’ is this market, the greater is the im-
plied sovereign risk (contrary to the bond market). The 
traditional CRAs have adopted this methodology for 
their corporate credit ratings business (Fitch, 2007) and 
extended it into the sovereign sector. Since 2002 they all 
began to track sovereign CDS prices in indexes (Gail-
lard, 2012, p. 172) as well as provide market-implied rat-
ings that translate prices from the CDS, bond and equity 
markets into standard rating language for both the issuer 
and the security. Like traditional credit ratings, CDSs are 
‘independent’ from factors such as captive buyers and safe 
haven dynamics of market turmoil, and the CDS market 
therefore does not replicate the bond market and often 
diverges. So, for example, as Germany’s cost of CDS pro-
tection widened by 20% along with the southern coun-
tries of the Eurozone in May 2012, Markit pointed out 
that the CDS market may be reflecting real, fundamental 
concerns about Germany as it is increasingly becoming 
clear that the ‘powerhouse’ of Europe is not immune to 
the Eurozone turmoil, risk of a messy break-up of the 
Euro, or the unpopular alternative of quasi-federalism. 
Thus in the wake of the crisis a range of alternative 
organizations, calculative mechanisms and indices are 
emerging in the sovereign risk business that claim a su-
perior methodology and more accurate assessments. But 
what these approaches share is, first a commitment to key 
ratios like the debt to GDP indicator, and/or a ‘mark-to-
market’ pricing valuation arrangement that tracks actual 
market prices for CDS. The BlackRock Sovereign Risk 
Index, on the other hand, rejects these indicators as being 
inadequate (though it embraces them in part – see below) 
and adopts a ‘research-led’ methodology instead10. Black 
Rock is the leading institution claiming a new role for 
sovereign debt assessment. Initially comprising 44 coun-
tries, BlackRock’s index produces a ranking of sovereigns 
according to their relative likelihood of default, devalu-
ation or above trend inflation based on four conceptual 
categories (BlackRock 2011, June): 
1) Fiscal space contains two equally weighted meas-
ures for debt sustainability: ‘proximity to distress’ (the ad-
ditional debt that would lead to a country defaulting) and 
‘distance from stability’ (the fiscal adjustment required to 
reach a sustainable debt level for the future), calculated 
by a formula that stipulates a 60% target debt/ GDP 
rate for high-income countries and 30% for low-income 
countries (see a criticism of these ratios below). 
2) External Finance Position looks at the susceptibility 
to macroeconomic trade and policy shocks outside the 
control of the country. 
3) Financial Sector Health considers the share of fi-
nancial sector debt as % of GDP as well as ‘Credit Bub-
ble Risk’, and the degree to which the financial sector 
of a country poses a threat to its creditworthiness if its 
liabilities are to be taken over by the sovereign (i.e. na-
tionalized).
4) Willingness to pay assesses the particularity of sov-
ereign creditworthiness by examining the ‘qualitative cul-
tural and institutional traits that suggest both ability and 
willingness to pay-off real debts’.
These features are combined into a weighted index 
(40:20:30:10 respectively), an example of which is given 
in Figure 4. 
Note that the classic safe haven countries like the 
US, UK and Germany are not at the top of this list but 
in the medium range of the index and the most credit-
worthy countries are not the most liquid but those most 
isolated from risks associated with external and internal 
financial shocks. Thus Norway, Singapore, Sweden and 
Switzerland take the prime spots and Chile and South 
Korea feature in the top 10. The result is a new sovereign 
risk world order where the traditional roles of developed 
and emerging economies are unsettled or even reversed.
BlackRock acknowledges that its sovereign risk index 
places great emphasis on the relative ranking and order-
ing of sovereigns and in that respect differs from credit 
ratings – where countries can share the same absolute 
ratings11. The index is further a conscious move away from 
‘insurance-weighted indexing’ described above, that has 
until recently dominated bond indexing and weights 
bond portfolio shares according to those countries who 
issue the most debt. Market value weighted indexes that 
favour capitalisation, liquidity and demand over funda-
mental analysis are argued to overweight large issuers of 
liabilities, impeding proper ‘price discovery’ in traded 
debt markets. With sovereigns in particular much idi-
osyncratic risk remains that cannot be diversified away 
and holds no reward for bearing it, so traditional Capital 
Asset Pricing Model considerations are not relevant. By 
contrast, BlackRock holds that the key advantage of its 
research driven as opposed to market driven index is that 
it does not favour the weaker credit issuers with higher 
portfolio representation. It claims that most bond indices 
reward failure (giving high weights to heavy issuers) and 
penalise success – whereas its index rewards success and 
penalises failure, putting it on a par with equity-based 
indices.
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So what we are witnessing is a world no longer defined 
by the bell curve but one in which the average outcomes 
– for growth, inflation, corporate and sovereign defaults, 
and the investment returns driven by these outcomes – 
will matter less and less for investors and policymakers, 
where the distribution of outcomes is flatter and the tails 
are fatter and the mean of the distribution becomes an 
observation that is very rarely realised. Their sovereign 
risk index is based on a new understanding that while the 
past empirical experience for developing market econo-
mies is limited, going forward the risks are likely to be 
quite different. Along with traditional interest rate and 
liquidity premia, compensation for credit risk is now be-
ing built more explicitly into the yields of all countries, 
irrespective of their historical default experience or share 
of global production. In fact, developed economies can 
present greater systemic risk because of their deeper fi-
nancial markets BlackRock argues. So a more intelligence 
based approach is needed, that dispenses with past cor-
relations as indicators of future trends and instead relies 
on intuition, simplicity and fast repositioning conducted 
on an almost day by day basis.
This also indicates to a move away from bond markets 
as the prime site for risk assessment. Thus new financial 
regulations such as the Basel III banking regulation12, 
which stipulate that banks do not have to provide collat-
eral against their investments in government bonds with 
ratings of AA- or higher and investments in bonds issued 
by the home government require no buffer regardless of 
the rating, are totally inadequate, it is suggested. The 
bond markets are systematically rigged by governments 
and CBs, it is claimed by the likes of BlackRock, captive 
to an insurance based safe haven dynamic which will only 
lead to trouble. 
Credit rating agencies, for example, unlike the decen-
tralised knowledge production of the market, use meth-
ods that show a striking similarity to central planning, it 
is suggested (Rona-Tas & Hiss 2011). Just like planners, 
these agencies collect information in a bureaucratic fash-
ion as local knowledge percolates up through standard-
ised forms and reports, and then apply complex, scien-
tific methods to analyse this information. Just as central 
planners do, these agencies present themselves as actors 
following only their own principles, unaffected by their 
social environments. But, perhaps somewhat ironically, 
the BlackRock index could be accused of similar sins.
5. Conclusions
So what is the bottom line in respect to sovereign debt, 
economic growth and the possible new era? A lot of the 
BlackRock criticism of other calculative methods is, of 
figure 4: the blackrock sovereign risk index (June 2013)
Source: < http://www.blackrock.com/corporate/en-dk/news-and-insights/blackrock-investment-institute-risk-index# > -- accessed October 
7, 2013)
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course, marketing hype: it needs to justify its product and 
differentiate this from the competition. There is not going 
to be a rapid erosion of the traditional CRAs role and a 
complete undermining of their position. But ultimately 
does it matter whether governments and their CBs are 
heavily in debt, or more heavily in debt than they used 
to be (other than in periods of severe national crisis like 
Wars). This issue was posed recently in a slightly differ-
ent context, around the Rogoff and Reinhardt (R&R) 
dispute over the importance of different debt/GDP ratios 
for the prospects of economic growth. R&R had argued 
a debt/GDP ratio of over 90% was historically associ-
ated with significantly slower growth rates (R&R 2009, 
2010). This has been used by ‘fiscal conservatives’ to argue 
the need for severe austerity and a cut back in public ex-
penditure. Subsequently it was discovered that there were 
several ‘errors’ in the original R&R analysis, in terms of 
coding the data (Denmark, along with four other leading 
OECD countries were left out), in dealing with outliers 
and with the presentation and interpretation of results 
(Herndon, et.al, 2013). The outcome is that it is disput-
able whether the ‘90% rule’ is robust and that a causal 
relationship between high government debt/GDP ratio 
and low growth can be established (it might go the other 
way (R&R 2013) – note also that BlackRock has its own 
% rules which seem equally as arbitrary).
However, this tends to ignore a key point about the 
demand for government debt (Lysandrou 2013). In the 
aggregate investors are desperate for ‘safe havens’ and 
good quality public debt because there is a surplus of 
savings in the international system. In part, this is why 
Denmark can offer negative or zero interest rates and 
still attracts funds: it is consider a super-safe haven. The 
private sector is amiss in providing this – it is not invest-
ing much so not issuing new shares, it has been ‘buy-back 
big time’ for corporate shares as companies have been 
trying to boost ‘shareholder value’ and provide incentives 
and the right conditions for enhancing executive remu-
neration, and the corporate sector’s BSs are in a complete 
mess. This means the supply of corporate paper has been 
diminishing and its reliability challenged. The only alter-
native ‘relatively’ safe havens are sovereigns, even though 
some of them are being slightly downgraded by the es-
tablished CRAs. So there is no shortage of demand for 
government debt, indeed there is a deep market for it. 
This is also because, relative to their growing significance 
in terms of global GDP, the emerging market economies 
are much smaller issues of securities, so demand has been 
concentrated on advanced country securities. Generally, 
this makes it easy for sovereigns to maintain very low 
interest rates. But its implication is clear. There is no real 
‘crises of sovereign debt’ so CBs might be able to easily 
unwind their positions. And governments need not worry 
unduly about their fiscal position. They could quite eas-
ily issue more debt, which would be eagerly absorbed by 
investors who have ‘nowhere else to go’.
notes
1. Clearly, this figure underestimates the final total for the US finan-
cial system as a whole as it does not included support for Freddie 
Mae, Freddie Mac or AIG, for instance. It just records amounts 
extended to banks.
2. „During 2008-2012, China’s broadly-defined money stock (M2) 
doubled in size, increasing from 47.5 trillion yuan (7.5 trillion dol-
lars) to 97.4 trillion yuan (15.7 trillion dollars). As a result, the 
Chinese economy is heavily levered—outstanding bank loans more 
than doubled, climbing from 30.3 trillion yuan (4.9 trillion dollars) 
in 2008 to 67.2 trillion yuan (10.8 trillion dollars) in 2012; out-
standing bonds also rose from 12.3 trillion yuan (2 trillion dollars) 
to 23.8 trillion yuan (3.8 trillion dollars); and trust funds increased 
from less than one trillion yuan (16 billion dollars) to 7.5 trillion 
yuan (1.2 trillion dollars)“ (Yu and Lan 2013, p. 20)
3. In the USA QE was preceded by the Troubled Assets Relief Program 
(TARP), mentioned above – an emergency measure introduced in 
October 2008. QE proper began in March 2009. But sometimes 
TARP is designated QE 1, so the QE policy sequence often dis-
cussed in the literature would be shifted along by one digit for each 
phase.
4. This can account for the basic ‘failure’ of the orthodox monetarist 
project of the 1980s of trying to control the economy by control-
ling the money supply. The only way the authorities could actually 
have directly controlled the money supply would have been by fully 
socializing the financial system, not something monetarism could 
have contemplated. Paradoxically strict monetarism requires finan-
cial nationalization.
5. The success or otherwise of the various QE programs in the US 
remains controversial. It has certainly worked to keep long-term 
interest rates low. In part this was aided by another novel policy de-
velopment undertaken as part of QE2, namely ‘operation twist’: the 
US Fed’s policy of selling short-term Treasuries to fund the buying 
of the long-term bonds. This ‘twisted’ the yield curve (short-term 
rates rose and long-term rates fell).
6. In the UK a huge fuss was made when the new Governor of the 
Bank of England (Mark Carney) announced a similar pre-commit-
ment strategy to target unemployment (at 7%) by the BoE in August 
2013.
7. In May 2013 the overnight deposit rate was -0.1%, and the bench-
mark lending rate just 0.3%. The background to Denmark’s fi-
nancial problems is admirably sketched by Frances Schwartzkopff: 
‘ECB Agenda Tests Central Bank Extremes in Denmark: Nordic 
Credit’ Bloomberg News, 10 May 2013. < http://www.bloomberg.
com/news/2013-05-02/ecb-agenda-tests-central-bank-extremes-
in-denmark-nordic-credit.html > (accessed 23 June 2013)
8. For example ‘Cleared OTC Credit Default Swaps’, marketed by the 
CME Group, see < http://www.cmegroup.com/trading/cds/ >
9. See < http://www.markit.com/en/ > ‘CDS Index Pricing and 
Trade Volume’ and < http://www.markit.com/assets/en/docs/faqs/
Markit_FAQs.pdf > ‘About Markit and CDS Data’. Markit receives 
CDS data from market makers off their official books and records. 
This data then undergoes a process of ‘cleansing’ to test for stale 
data, outliers and inconsistencies. Markit claims this ensure supe-
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rior data quality for an accurate mark-to-market and better risk 
surveillance.
10. BlackRock is a world-wide US based investment company, claiming 
to be the largest fund management company in the world.
11. Much of the following information about the BlackRock approach 
to sovereign risk assessment comes from its periodic ‘investment 
insights’ which can be accessed from < http://www.blackrock.
com/corporate/en-dk/news-and-insights/blackrock-investment-
institute?page=1 >. I would also like to acknowledge several un-
published papers by Nina Boy, particularly her ‘The Emperor’s new 
clothes – or how do political-economic fictions fail? The crisis of 
sovereign credit’, which contain stimulating suggestions about the 
importance of BlackRock ’s interventions in the sovereign debt mar-
ket, many of which are developed here.
12. Basel III is a regulatory mechanism devise by the Basel based Bank 
for International Settlements which establishes capital adequacy 
standards for major international banks. As its name implies Basel 
III is the third such set of regulatory instruments issues by the Bank.
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